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Threats

Someone… What stops them
finds the tunnel URL A Noise handshake only a paired key completes. Failed handshakes are counted per address: 8 in 10 minutes and it’s shut out. The URL changes each time.
photographs the QR The token works once, for two minutes; pairing needs matching emoji confirmed on the laptop.
uses the QR before your phone Your phone’s pairing fails (token spent) and you see a request with emoji your phone doesn’t show: refuse it.
steals the phone The app opens only with fingerprint and its own password; risky actions ask again; ekatva unpair revokes it at once.
runs the tunnel or the Wi-Fi Sees ciphertext and sizes only.
tampers with traffic The frame fails to decrypt and the session closes.
deletes or changes files through the phone It’s in the log on both devices; the old version is in the undo store.
tries to grant itself more ekatva’s state (grants, log, keys) is unreachable through files, and admin is never grantable to a phone.
edits the log to hide it The hash chain breaks, and the other device’s mirror disagrees.
answers Claude’s next question by a late tap Answers carry the question’s hash and only land on that question.
watches the ntfy server Sees a random topic name and ciphertext; can’t read, forge or usefully replay a message (each carries its time, refused after 10 minutes).
finds the tunnel URL from the mailbox Can’t: it’s encrypted; and the URL alone only leads to a Noise handshake.
runs as you on the laptop (an agent gone rogue) Can use ekatva’s local socket, as it can read your files: it’s yours. Keep the phone’s own grants (Settings on the phone) to what you need; everything it does is in both logs.
floods the daemon with huge frames Frames over 64 KiB are refused by the server; reassembly stops at 16 MB.